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The Fragility of an Independent Judiciary: 
Lessons from Hungary and Poland – and the European Union1 
 
Kriszta Kovács and Kim Lane Scheppele 
 
 
 By the time of the “big bang” accession in 2004, when ten new Member States entered 
the European Union, it seemed that the fate of East-Central Europe was settled.   From that time 
forward, the westward states of post-communist Europe were certified as democracies in good 
standing, ready for membership in the most exclusive club in the world.   At the time, political 
scientists spoke of “consolidated democracies” (Linz and Stepan, 1996), defined as countries in 
which democracy was the “only game in town” because there were no realistic alternatives.   A 
country whose democracy was consolidated would stay a democracy forever.  Or so the experts 
thought. 
 Before the first decade was out on the big bang accession, however, it became painfully 
clear that a consolidated democracy could come unraveled.   Hungary’s constitutional system 
began imploding shortly after 2010 so that by 2015, Freedom House lowered its assessment of 
Hungary from a consolidated to semi-consolidated democracy (Freedom House, 2015), the first 
time a consolidated democracy had officially fallen from grace.   Shortly thereafter, Poland began 
a short, sharp slide toward autocracy, with Freedom House reducing its overall democracy score 
for 2018 to a level where it just barely hung onto consolidated democratic status (Freedom 
 
1 The events we describe in this chapter are fast moving.  The chapter is current as of July 2018 and 
events after that date could not be taken into account here.   
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House, 2018).  Since that score appeared, things have not improved.  When it came to democratic 
consolidation, it turned out that what went up could also go down. 
 What happened?  In both Hungary and Poland, parties with autocratically inclined leaders 
were voted into power with unprecedented majorities.  The Fidesz party in Hungary won two-
thirds of the parliamentary seats in the 2010 election, giving the party a constitutional majority, 
which it has largely retained to the present day.2  The Law and Justice (PiS in its Polish acronym) 
party in Poland won an absolute majority of seats in the lower house of parliament in 2015, 
governing as a single party alone for the first time in the country’s modern democratic history, 
while simultaneously capturing the presidency and the upper house of the parliament.   In both 
cases, the elections could be seen as ordinary rotations of parties away from those that had 
already been in power for too long (Scheppele, 2018).    But in both cases, these pivotal elections, 
which gave full legislative and executive power to a single party, spelled the beginning of the end 
of consolidated democracy in East-Central Europe.  
It was each country’s bad luck that the leaders of these successful parties – Viktor Orbán 
in Hungary and Jarosław  Kaczyński in Poland – lied about their revolutionary ambitions before 
they were elected.  Had these leaders been honest about their autocratic plans, it is unclear that 
either could have won.  Once in office, however, both Orbán and Kaczyński began attacking key 
independent public institutions in order to eliminate them as veto points.   The first institutions 
to be attacked were the constitutional judiciaries which were poised to hold Orbán and Kaczyński 
 
2 For two years between its second and third consecutive elections, Fidesz lost its two-thirds majority in 
two by-elections but sometimes managed to pass laws requiring “relative” two-thirds majorities (two-
thirds of those present and voting).  Constitutional amendments require an “absolute” two-thirds (two-
thirds of all MPs).   
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to account under the constitutions they inherited.   Once the constitutional courts were 
neutralized, the ordinary judiciaries were dismembered when they held out the possibility for 
individuals and opposition groups to challenge through law what these new autocratic 
governments were doing.    Judicial independence, once quite strong in both Poland and Hungary, 
is now a thing of the past.    
 Perhaps no one was more surprised at democratic backsliding in East-Central Europe than 
the leaders of EU institutions, who – along with the academic consensus – had believed that 
consolidated democracy was irreversible. They had had faith that national institutions in general 
– and judiciaries in particular – could contain any values-based threat that might arise.    The EU 
had carried out a thorough check of countries on their way in the door but made no provision for 
ongoing monitoring of the democratic health of Member States once they were admitted.  
Consolidated democracies were supposed to stay consolidated, so there seemed to be no need.   
At EU level, however, the deconsolidation of democratic government not only posed a threat of 
contagion, as we have already seen with the uptake of autocratic tactics now in Poland.  But 
deconsolidation also threatened the operation of the EU as such.   The Member State judiciaries 
are the institutions through which EU law is enforced throughout the Union.  If they are disabled, 
the Member States are not the only ones who suffer, but the EU suffers too because its writ does 
not run throughout the EU if the national courts do not ensure uniform compliance with EU law.     
 It did not help that the European Union believed it had few tools to prevent democratic 
backsliding because the EU was designed to protect Member States from an overreaching Union 
rather than to protect the Union from failing Member States.   Treaty change requires unanimous 
agreement among the Member States; even ordinary legislation cannot be passed without a 
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qualified majority approval of the Member States. Comitology ensured that the EU could not 
enforce the rules laid down in a manner too far from what the Member States would tolerate.  
Without the Member States supporting in force what the EU does, in other words, the EU can do 
very little.   And the Member States do not contemplate being seriously sanctioned themselves.  
In the basic design of the EU, Member States largely protected themselves from sanction from 
the center.   Member States can quit (hence, Brexit) but they cannot be thrown out.    
The primary sanctions mechanism for values-based non-compliance in EU law is a political 
process identified in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) that requires supermajority 
agreement of the other Member States to identify a risk of non-compliance.  It requires a 
unanimous judgment of all other Member States except the offender to determine that EU values 
have in fact been breached.   With even one other fellow-traveler state supporting an offender, 
Article 7 TEU has been thought impossible to use.   Now the EU has two.   As we will see, the 
other legal process for ensuring the uniform enforcement of EU law, the infringement procedure, 
allows the European Commission to bring Member States to the European Court of Justice if the 
Member State violates EU law.  But infringement procedures to date have been used for relatively 
technical violations – nothing so big as a threat to European values or the deconsolidation of a 
democratic state.   
 The attack on the national judiciaries is the most important element in the EU’s 
democratic backsliding story because, with disabled judiciaries, no one can be assured of fair 
treatment once they challenge the government.  If courts will not neutrally enforce the law – 
whether national or EU law – then it becomes impossible for those inside or outside the state to 
to counter the autocratic state through legal means.    For that reason, we’ll concentrate in this 
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chapter on the methods and results of the attacks on the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland, 
focusing on the interventions that the European Union attempted to make as the judiciaries were 
politically captured.  First we’ll explain what happened in Hungary and then we will turn to 
Poland.   We’ll conclude by explaining why the European Union has been so powerless (so far) to 
arrest the capture of the courts and what it could still do now.    
 
I.  Judicial Independence in Hungary 
 
Hungary’s national parliamentary election of 2010 occurred at a bad time for the country.  
Hungary had been hit hard by the global financial crisis when a housing bubble fueled by foreign-
currency-denominated mortgages burst just as the government’s debt itself became 
unsustainable.  The IMF, the lender of last resort, bailed Hungary out in 2008, insisting on a 
program of radical austerity.   Forced to make swingeing cuts to the state budget causing more 
pain all around, the Socialist government of the day was clearly going to lose the upcoming 
election in 2010.   Besides, the Socialists had been in power for eight years, longer than any other 
post-communist Hungarian government and had presided over a moral crisis in which much of 
the Hungarian public believed that the sitting government was both corrupt and mendacious. As 
a result, voters in 2010 voted to elect the main opposition party at that time, Fidesz (which ran 
in coalition with a tiny almost non-existent party, the Christian Democrats).   
The Fidesz-Christian Democratic coalition won a landslide victory in the general elections 
in 2010, which opened the way for a profound shift in the direction of the state even though the 
victorious parties did not campaign on a platform of constitutional reform.  The lightly 
6 
 
entrenched 1989 democratic constitution, still in force at that time, could be amended by a single 
two-thirds vote of the Parliament, and the new government, headed by Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán, had 68 per cent of the seats.  This numerical reality gave Fidesz the possibility of changing 
the constitution at will.  One year into its term, after the governing coalition had amended the 
constitution it inherited 12 times, it adopted a wholly new constitution without the support of 
any other party.  This new “Fundamental Law,” as it was called, signaled that the constitutional 
transformation had begun.   
 The Fundamental Law changed the fundamental characteristics of Hungarian 
constitutionalism.  Instead of the universal principles of liberty, equality and democracy that had 
animated the old constitution, the new Fundamental Law now has its foundation in the 
contentious, nationalistic, historical and religious narrative of the preamble (Kovács and Tóth, 
2011: 198ff).  Moreover, the Fundamental Law aims at consolidating the power of the ruling 
parliamentary majority by restricting the competitive political process (Arato, Halmai and Kis 
2012: 483).  In the Hungarian system of government, a two-thirds governing majority is the 
supreme and constitutionally unlimited organ of state power because this majority can amend 
the constitution at will. 
 In its first few years, the Fundamental Law was elaborated by more than 800 new laws, 
changing the whole legal system established after the democratic transition of 1989.  The new 
legal order rapidly removed virtually all of the checks on executive power that the first 
democratic constitution of 1989-1990 had managed to install (Bánkuti, Halmai and Scheppele, 
2012).  Previously, the judiciary and the Constitutional Court were the institutions that served as 
main checks on the power of governmental majorities.  But already in 2011, European bodies 
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called the attention to the fact that neither the independence of the Constitutional Court nor the 
independence of the judiciary were expressly guaranteed in the Fundamental Law (Venice 
Commission, 2011: para 102; Venice Commission, 2012b: para 10). The European Parliament 
expressed concern about “the weakening of the system of checks and balances” (European 
Parliament, 2011: para F.).  Similar concerns were raised by the Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO, 2015).  But the Hungarian government did not respond.    The critics were 
proven correct in their warnings.   
 In Hungary’s unicameral parliamentary system after 1990, the Constitutional Court was 
the strongest check in the constitutional structure.  But immediately after its election in 2010, 
the Fidesz governmentattacked the independence and the competencies of the Constitutional 
Court.  First, an early constitutional amendment of 5 July 2010 changed the selection procedure 
for the justices of the Constitutional Court and the election rules for the Court’s president. Since 
then the president of the Court has been elected by a two-third vote of the Parliament while 
Constitutional Court judges have been nominated by a parliamentary committee that the 
governing party dominates, followed by a two-thirds vote of the Parliament, so only governing 
party votes are needed to select new judges (European Parliament, 2011: para Q). Later, through 
another constitutional amendment (Act LXI/2011), the parliamentary majority, noting that 
jurisdictional changes it had made under the new constitution increased the Court’s workloads, 
changed the number of judges on the Constitutional Court from 11 to 15, so the government 
could select more judges for the Court without gaining support of any other parliamentary party.  
By spring 2013, the Constitutional Court was effectively neutralized as a check on government 
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because the governing coalition had named a majority of the judges who in turn refused to nullify 
almost any law that the government supported.  
 As the Court was being packed, however, it fought back.   When it nullified a 98% 
retroactive tax on severance bonuses for those who had served in the last (non-Fidesz) 
government,3 the governing coalition amended the old constitution (Act CXX of 2010) to restrict 
the competencies of the Constitutional Court so that the Court could no longer review the 
constitutionality of certain financial measures. The Venice Commission criticized this restriction 
(Venice Commission, 2012b: para. 38), and reiterated this criticism with growing urgency in 
repeated opinions (Venice Commission, 2013: para 113).  But the government did not back down, 
instead eventually entrenching this restriction on constitutional review in Art. 37.4 of the 
Fundamental Law with the new constitution’s Fourth Amendment in 2013. 
 The Fourth Amendment, which marked the final capture of the Constitutional Court by 
the governing coalition, also nullified the entire case law of the Constitutional Court from 1990–
2011, so none of the decisions of the Court from before the enactment of the new constitution 
could be relied on as legal authority.  The Fourth Amendment also inserted directly into the 
constitution nearly all of the legal provisions that the once-independent Constitutional Court had 
found unconstitutional after the Fidesz government took office (European Parliament, 2013: 
paras AM-AR).   The entire activity of the Constitutional Court between its founding and the date 
of the Fourth Amendment was therefore destroyed as a matter of law by this amendment.   To 
complete the government domination of the Court, the Fourth Amendment also prevented the 
 
3 Hungarian Constitutional Court Decision 184/2010 struck down the tax, a judgment that the European 
Court of Human Rights later upheld when it found that the former public servants had property rights in 
their bonuses which could not be taken away retroactively. N.K.M. v. Hungary, Judgment of 14 May 2013. 
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Court from reviewing all constitutional amendments, including the Fourth Amendment, for their 
compliance with the basic principles of the Fundamental Law. 
 While the Fundamental Law formally retained the Constitutional Court on paper, the 
changes in its functioning were considerable in practice.  The Fundamental Law abolished the 
primary vehicle for constitutional challenges before that time:  actio popularis petition, though 
which anyone could turn to the Constitutional Court to request review of the constitutionality of 
laws.  There are now three ways that laws and normative acts can come before the Constitutional 
Court.  
 First, certain identified parties may ask for abstract constitutional review.  The 
government itself, one-fourth of the MPs, the President of the Kúria (newly renamed Supreme 
Court), the Prosecutor General or the Ombudsperson for Fundamental Rights can initiate this 
procedure (Sec. 24.1 of Act CLI/2011 on the Constitutional Court).  The government is unlikely to 
ask for review of its own legal acts, and the current President of the Kúria, the Prosecutor General 
and the Ombudsperson were all chosen by this government from among those friendly to their 
party.  From this group, only the Ombudsperson has ever brought cases to the Constitutional 
Court and he has said that he only brings cases that he deems to be not “political” (IBAHRI,2015: 
35).  While the parliamentary opposition might be expected to bring abstract review cases, the 
current parliamentary opposition, less than one-third of the MPs, is divided almost equally 
between fragmented parties of the left and a party of the far right.  Given this configuration, it 
happens very rarely that one-quarter of the MPs agree on constitutional challenges.  Abstract 
review has therefore virtually disappeared when it was once the most common form of 
constitutional review. In 2017, only about 1 per cent of the Constitutional Court’s caseload (4 
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cases out of 461) were based on abstract review petitions (Constitutional Court of Hungary, 
2017). 
 A second way that cases can now come to the Constitutional Court is through the judicial 
initiative.  If a judge is bound to apply a legal rule that she perceives to be unconstitutional, the 
judge shall suspend the proceedings and submit a petition to the Constitutional Court for its 
determination of the constitutionality of the law (Sec 25.1 of Act CLI/2011).  But judges use this 
option rarely.   In 2017, only about 10 per cent of the Constitutional Court’s caseload, 48 out of 
461 were judicial initiatives (Constitutional Court of Hungary, 2017).  
The third possibility for bringing cases to the Constitutional Court, and by far the largest 
contributor to the Court’s docket now, is the newly enacted constitutional complaint.  By 
introducing a constitutional complaint against court decisions the Fundamental Law cleverly 
shifted the focus of the review from the law itself to its application. 
  In 2017, most of the petitions before the Constitutional Court (330 out of 461) challenged 
other court decisions (Constitutional Court of Hungary, 2017) and not the underlying state action 
or the underlying law itself.  
 From once having been the key check on executive and legislative power in the 
constitutional order, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has now both been packed with political 
allies and also had its wings clipped.  The constitutionality of laws and of government actions can 
therefore not be guaranteed.   
 Capturing and neutralizing the Constitutional Court was just the beginning, however.  The 
ordinary judiciary has been attacked as well.  Beginning with Act CLXII/2011 on the Status and 
Remuneration of Judges, the independence of the ordinary courts has been threatened.  This law 
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lowered the age-limit for compulsory retirement from 70 to 62-65 years according to a gradual 
system depending on the date of birth of judges.  The vast majority of senior judges – between 
10-15% of all judges in the country, and disproportionately including judges in the leadership of 
the courts – were forced to leave the bench almost immediately. The not-yet-packed Hungarian 
Constitutional Court in its decision 33/2012 found that lowering the judicial retirement age as 
applied to sitting judges was unconstitutional because it violated the principle of judicial 
irremovability.  In response, the government inserted the already annulled provision on the 
retirement age into the Fundamental Law as an amendment (now Art 26.2 of the Fundamental 
Law). The Venice Commission strongly criticized the move and did not see “a material justification 
for the forced retirement of judges (including many holders of senior court positions)” (Venice 
Commission, 2012a: para 104).  The European Commission also raised concerns about Hungary’s 
decision to reduce suddenly the retirement age of judges (European Commission 2012, para G). 
The Commission brought an infringement action to the European Court of Justice which in turn 
held that premature judicial retirements were a violation of EU law on age discrimination 
(Commission v. Hungary, Case C-286/12, 6 November 2012).  Hungary paid compensation but 
was able to avoid restoring the most important judges to their prior posts (IBAHRI, 2015).   
Though the Commission took rapid action to challenge this firing of judges and ECJ condemned 
the practice, the Hungarian government won the facts on the ground by keeping all of its newly 
appointed judges when the case (that they lost) was over.    
 At the same time as judges were being fired en masse, a unique system of judicial 
administration — existing in no other European country — was introduced through the abolition 
of the previous structure of judicial self-governance and the creation of a new National Judicial 
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Office (Act CLXI/2011 on the Organisation and Administration of Courts of Hungary). The 
president of the new National Judicial Office has the power to exercise the ‘central 
responsibilities of the administration of the courts’ (Fundamental Law, Art. 25.5), which also 
includes the power to appoint new judges conditioned only on the countersignature of the 
President of the Republic.   This lone official is, therefore, the “crucial decision-maker in 
practically every aspect of the organization of the judicial system” (Venice Commission 2012a, 
para. 118). The current incumbent, elected by the parliamentary supermajority for a term of nine 
years, has complete discretionary power to promote and demote judges as well as transfer and 
reassign them, and she has a role in initiating and organizing judicial discipline.  Her sweeping 
powers give her control over every aspect of a judge’s career and, according to the Venice 
Commission, “the essential elements of the reform not only contradict European standards for 
the organisation of the judiciary, especially its independence, but are also problematic as 
concerns the right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR” (Venice Commission 2012a, para. 117). 
Although a so-called National Judicial Council composed of judges is also part of the system, it 
has scarcely any significant powers and plays only a negligible role in the administration of the 
judiciary. Given the new system, judges cannot enjoy true autonomy and independence from the 
National Judicial Office (European Parliament 2013, paras AV-BC). 
 The new system of political control over the courts also changed the qualifications for the 
presidency of the Supreme Court.  These new qualifications had the effect of removing the 
incumbent president before the end of his lawful term. The European Court of Human Rights 
found that the premature termination of the President’s mandate had violated the right of access 
to a court and the right to freedom of expression (Baka v. Hungary, Judgment of 27 May 2014), 
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but here too, the remedy was compensation and not reinstatement.  It was hard to reach the 
principle of judicial independence through a human rights convention when the violation did not 
occur in the form of an unfair trial.   As with the judicial retirement case at the ECJ, the Hungarian 
government lost the case but it got the new court president it wanted. 
 In 2011, the government began floating the idea of establishing a separate system of 
administrative courts.   For years, however, the administrative court proposal was stalled because 
it proved surprisingly controversial among Fidesz loyalists.  Unlike the other court-capturing laws 
which were forwarded with rationales that one might believe were connected to reasonable 
reform (e.g. getting rid of judges trained in the communist time, adding judges to a system that 
would now have more cases), this one seemed too obviously aimed at creating a separate court 
system for politically sensitive cases in which the government would always win by design.  But 
in 2016, parliament passed two laws, Act CL/2016 on Administrative Procedure and T/12234  Act 
on Administrative Court Procedure, laws that would have created a parallel judiciary of 
administrative courts.  The latter not yet promulgated Act was referred by the President of 
Hungary to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary review.  In its Decision 1/2017, the Court 
declared the Act unconstitutional because the creation of new courts outside the regular 
judiciary required a constitutional majority of a two-thirds vote in the Parliament.  But these laws 
had passed during a period when Fidesz lost its two-thirds majority in two by-elections,  so it had 
counted on getting these laws through on a simple majority, which the Constitutional Court 
blocked.  But the government proceeded as far as it could anyway; in February 2017, Parliament 
adopted Act I/2017 on Administrative Court Procedure without the contested provisions and 
both statutes entered into force on January 1, 2018. 
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 Since then eight specialized administrative regional centers within the general judiciary 
have been tasked with a whole range of politically sensitive cases. They have the sole jurisdiction 
to rule in appeals against the administrative decisions of those public bodies that are supposed 
to be most independent of the government, like the Hungarian National Bank or the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. In these cases, politically aligned judicial review could reverse decisions 
that the government was otherwise not able to control. These regional courts also have unusual 
jurisdiction in two types of individual rights cases with political implications: ‘right to assembly’ 
cases that involve permits for public demonstrations and freedom of information cases that 
would expose the internal workings of the government if requests were granted (Sec. 12 of Act 
I/2017).  These administrative chambers also hear appeals against the decisions of the county 
governments.  But, operating as they have within the general judiciary, they have not ensured 
the degree of control over these cases that the governing party apparently wanted. 
 After the ruling coalition regained its two-thirds majority in the 2018 general election, it 
almost immediately pushed through the Parliament yet another amendment to the Fundamental 
Law, circling back to its earlier reforms that had been blocked. The Seventh Amendment to the 
Fundamental Law passed in July 2018 now permits the creation of a wholly separate public 
administration court system, including an Administrative Supreme Court that is separate from 
other public courts but with the same legal status as the Kúria.   The task of the Administrative 
Supreme Court will be to review the application of the law by the administrative courts, and to 
make “uniformity decisions” guiding interpretation of the law which are binding on the 
administrative courts. The constitutional amendment has brought significant changes to the 
system of public administration which will require further lawmaking to fill in, but these rules are 
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not yet known.  What is certain is that the new system of administrative courts will deepen the 
gap between the already existing two tracks of administrative procedures in Hungary: one 
dealing with core EU matters, where Hungary is careful to follow EU law, and the other dealing 
with domestic administration where the protections accorded to administrative review in the EU 
are missing (Kovács and Scheppele, 2017: 127).    The purpose of the new administrative courts, 
in which earlier drafts have hinted that the “judges” will have neither legal training nor job 
security, seems to be to wall off administrative action from serious judicial scrutiny. 
 As these attacks on the independence of the judiciary continued over eight long years, 
some of the European Union institutions took note, made repeated criticisms, but ultimately did 
not succeed in altering the course of events substantially.   The most aggressive action taken by 
the European Commission was the expedited infringement procedure brought against Hungary 
as the government fired judges en masse by lowering their retirement ages.    But the Commission 
did not feel it could call what was happening by its proper name – interference with the 
independence of the judiciary.   The Treaties presume that all states will have independent 
judiciaries; there was, as the Commission saw it then, no black-letter legal provision either in the 
Treaties or in the rest of EU law that would have permitted the Commission to charge Hungary 
with destruction of something whose existence was not explicitly legally mandated but only 
presupposed.    So the Commission did the next best thing:   charge Hungary with violating the 
prohibition on age discrimination.   When the Commission won its case at the European Court of 
Justice, however, it won only the sort of remedy that discrimination cases bring, compensation 
for those who have been the victims.   When the government compensated the judges, the case 
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had to be closed (Scheppele, 2016).   But the Orbán government got to keep its captured judiciary.   
It was clear that the tools the European Commission felt it had were not up to the task.    
 The European Parliament was more active as the Hungarian government consolidated its 
control over the judiciary, passing resolution after resolution, most prominently on 3 July 2013 
the “Tavares Report,” named after its tenacious rapporteur who drafted a full-scale indictment 
of Hungary’s slide into autocracy.   But the other EU institutions – namely the Commission and 
the Council – largely ignored the parliamentary resolutions.   The parliament may have been 
calling Hungary out on each move in its fall from European norms, but no one appeared to be 
listening.   Throughout Hungary’s long slide into autocracy, the Council failed to say a critical 
word.    
 As the Barroso Commission was nearing the end of its term in 2014, Vice President Viviane 
Reding proposed, and the Commission adopted, a new “Rule of Law Framework.”  Designed to 
allow the Commission to enter a dialogue with a backsliding Member State and to permit the 
Commission to give concrete warnings and specific recommendations as the Commission 
considered whether Article 7 TEU should be launched, the Rule of Law Framework became 
available for use by the Commission just as new European elections meant that all those who had 
worked on the case against Hungary left office.  The new Commission elected in 2014 did not pick 
up where the old Commission left off.  When the European Parliament later called on the 
European Commission to invoke its rule of law mechanism for Hungary, the Commission did not 
find it necessary to do so. It has filed some infringement procedures against Hungary but there 
has been no talk of using the Rule of Law Framework to assess whether Hungary should be 
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subjected to a warning under Article 7 TEU.   Instead, Poland has occupied all of their energy, as 
we will see in the next section.   
As we write, however, the European Parliament has before it the “Sargentini report” which, 
if it passes by the requisite supermajority in fall 2018, would trigger Article 7(1) with regard to 
Hungary.   In this, neither the Commission nor the Council has been of much assistance and the 
Council would have to vote by a four-fifths majority to agree with the Parliament before a 
warning to the government of Hungary can issue.    
 
II.  Judicial Independence in Poland4 
 
Politics in Poland, as in Hungary, had become very polarized by the time of the time of 
the 2015 national elections.    The Civic-Platform-led government of the center-left had been in 
power for eight years, and its popular leader, Donald Tusk, had been drafted to Brussels to serve 
as the first new accession state president of the Council of the European Union.   Headless and 
running out of ideas, with its national support slipping, Civic Platform was bound to lose.   To 
make matters worse for the left, their supporters split their votes in the 2015 elections between 
Civic Platform and an upstart party called Modern Poland while the right voted en bloc for the 
PiS party.    With only half the voters turning out, and the victorious PiS party winning only 37.5% 
of the vote of that participating half, PiS gained an absolute majority of seats in both chambers 
 
4 The narrative in this section is drawn from Wojciech Sadurski, 2018a and 2018b; European Commission, 
2017; Venice Commission 2016a, 2016b and 2017.    
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of the Parliament, after having just won the Presidency in an election earlier in the year.    With 
half-hearted support from half the population, an autocratic government was born. 
Civic Platform committed the first constitutional offense, however, on its way out of 
office.   Seeing an opportunity to pack the Constitutional Tribunal itself before suffering an 
election defeat, the Civic Platform government had changed the law under which constitutional 
judges were elected (25 June 2015 amendment to the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal).   The 
old rule had been that the Parliament in power on the day that a judge’s term ended had the 
legal authority to fill that seat, but under the new rule, the Parliament could elect judges months 
ahead of an actual opening on the court.   Three judgeships came open under the old rule on 
Civic Platform’s watch but the outgoing Parliament elected five judges under the new rule – filling 
two openings that had not yet materialized but that would open up soon after the new PiS 
Parliament was seated.      
Given this unconstitutional maneuver (as the Constitutional Tribunal would later confirm 
in its judgment on 3 December 2015), PiS came to power with an “own goal” legal violation by 
Civil Platform from which PiS was determined to benefit.  None of the Civic Platform judges had 
been sworn in by PiS President of the Republic Andrzej Duda, so technically the seats that had 
not been filled before the election were still open. The PiS Parliament therefore cancelled the 
election of all five Civic Platform judges, even though only two had been illegally elected (19 
November 2015 amendment to the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal).  Instead, PiS elected five 
of its own judges to fill all of the open seats.  The Constitutional Tribunal, pulled into the political 
fight because it had to assess the legality of the election of all of these judges as well as the 
constitutionality of the laws under which they were all elected, properly found that three of the 
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judges elected by Civic Platform should be sworn in by the President along with two of the judges 
PiS had elected (Sadurski, 2018a).  But President Duda refused to publish the decisions of the 
Tribunal and also refused to swear in any of the Civic Platform judges.  Instead, President Duda 
swore in all five of the PiS judges.   The President of the Constitutional Tribunal then refused to 
seat the three illegally elected PiS judges and the stand-off was on.    
Unlike in the Hungarian case, where the European Commission watched nervously but 
did little as the judiciary was captured, European Commission this time got involved quite quickly.   
In December 2015, just as the stand-off between the Constitutional Tribunal and the government 
became serious, the Commission wrote to the Polish government, asking it to follow the decisions 
of the Constitutional Tribunal and to hold off on passing pending new legislation affecting the 
Tribunal until the Venice Commission could weigh in on the proposed bills.  When the Polish 
government went ahead and passed the worrisome laws anyway without waiting for the Venice 
Commission report, the European Commission invoked its Rule of Law Framework – originally 
designed for but never used in the case of Hungary.  Poland in January 2016 became the first 
target of this new tool.  The PiS government had only been in office for a few months, but already 
the European Commission had acted decisively to bring EU oversight to bear.   
The European Commission’s intervention made no difference, however.  During the 
whole of 2016, while the Constitutional Tribunal blocked the illegally elected PiS judges from 
taking their seats and the government refused to recognize the legal election of the Civic Platform 
judges, the PiS government bombarded the court with restrictive legislation.  No fewer than six 
laws affecting the Constitutional Tribunal’s procedures and powers were passed and signed into 
law during the stand-off.    One new restriction required a two-thirds majority on the Tribunal 
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before a vote of the judges could nullify a law (despite the fact that the Constitution itself 
required only a simple majority decision).  Given that the court was working at less than full 
strength while the controversy was going on, no such two-thirds could be attained.  The situation 
was made worse by a new legal provision that allowed any three judges on the court to require 
that any case be heard en banc with all of the judges present, which meant that no case could be 
decided that PiS friendly judges wanted to avoid as long as the stand-off over the judges 
continued.    To this was added a new requirement that the Prosecutor General be present for all 
cases of a full bench, so that the Prosecutor’s absence would mean that a case could not proceed.   
(Shortly before this, the government had given the Justice Minister the Prosecutor General’s 
portfolio, so this conditioned the Tribunal’s ability to hold a hearing in a case on the specific 
presence of a particular member of the government.)   Another restriction limited the court’s 
review of laws to those that had been already in effect for six months, which in turn created a 
sort of constitutional vacuum around all new laws which could not be challenged before they 
went into effect.  Yet another required the Tribunal to decide cases in the order in which they 
came in which meant that any cases involving the new PiS government would go to the back of 
the queue.  In the meantime, the government refused to publish many of the opinions of the 
court. 
Throughout this legal blitz, European institutions were active in criticizing these 
developments.  In March, an opinion of the Venice Commission condemned the law restricting 
the Constitutional Tribunal’s functioning (Venice Commission, 2016a).  In April, the European 
Parliament passed a resolution supporting the decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal against 
the government (European Commission, 2016).   Emboldened by this European support, the 
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General Assembly of the Supreme Court of Poland, consisting of all of the judges of the Supreme 
Court, passed a resolution stating that it would take the unpublished decisions of the 
Constitutional Tribunal as valid.    In the meantime, the European Commission met with the Polish 
government on numerous occasions to persuade it to end the stand-off and follow the Tribunal’s 
decisions.    
When the government refused to bend, the Commission in June 2016 issued a Rule of 
Law Opinion, a formal document that recorded the Commission’s objections, which – when it 
was met with no positive response from the Polish government – turned into a Rule of Law 
Recommendation in July (European Commission, 2016a).  (Opinions and recommendations are 
terms of art in the Rule of Law Framework, indicating increasing levels of seriousness and 
concern.)   The Recommendation stated that Poland in fact already suffered from a systemic 
threat to the rule of law and it demanded that Poland change its ways.   The Polish government 
refused to comply – and instead barreled ahead with new legislation designed to cripple the 
Constitutional Tribunal further (2 August 2016 Act on the Constitutional Tribunal).  The European 
Parliament adopted another critical resolution in September; the Venice Commission produced 
another critical report on another new law restricting the Constitutional Tribunal in October 
(Venice Commission, 2016b).   And the stand-off between the government and the Constitutional 
Tribunal continued for a whole year, despite all of the European criticism.  
The Constitutional Tribunal’s stand-off with the government ended with the close of 
2016.  In December 2016, the term of the president of the court, Andrzej Rzeplinski, came to its 
normal end.   He, supported by the other “legal” judges elected before 2015, had kept the illegal 
judges off the court to that point, but once Rzeplinski stepped down, the court was quickly 
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captured by the government.  European institutions were again active through this process.  Just 
as President Rzeplinski stepped down, the European Commission adopted a second 
Recommendation asking the Polish government to delay the process for selecting his successor 
(European Commission, 2016b).  But one of the legally elected PiS judges, Julia Przylebska, was 
made “interim president” of the Tribunal (a completely new position) by a hastily passed statute, 
even though the pre-existing rules of the court specified that the sitting vice-president (a judge 
who had been elected prior to 2015) should preside over the selection of the next president.  
Interim President Przylebska was almost immediately then elected the president of the Tribunal 
in a highly questionable process over which she herself presided.  Her election involved the 
violation of black-letter rules about how a new president of the Constitutional Tribunal should 
be selected (since she held only one vote of the other judges instead of two as required by law).  
And her elected resulted from illegally constituted vote.   Interim President Przylebska simply 
didn’t count the eight judges who refused to recognize her legal right to convene the proceedings 
as an “interim” president and who boycotted the proceedings but, to gain sufficient votes, she 
admitted all three of the illegally elected PiS judges to the bench just in time to vote for her.  With 
these tricks, she narrowly won the election over which she presided and became President of the 
Tribunal.   Several new vacancies on the Tribunal were engineered by the government’s 
retroactive challenge to the legitimacy of the election of three non-PiS judges, who were then 
replaced before their terms expired in moves that allowed PiS to capture the court’s majority by 
late spring 2017, less than two years into the PiS government’s term.    
As soon as the government gained a comfortable majority on the Tribunal, government’s 
attempts to tie its hands through nuisance regulation stopped.  As Wojciech Sadurski wrote:  
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All of these legislative attacks on the Tribunal [CT] only continued up to the point when 
PiS acquired a majority on the CT (8 out of 15)—at which time all these innovations were 
miraculously forgotten because they had become unnecessary (Sadurski, 2018a).    
 
Instead, once the Tribunal could be considered friendly, the government then sent it numerous 
petitions to legitimate the government’s various rule-of-law challenging activities.   In short 
order, the Constitutional Tribunal in its decision K5/17 declared the statute regulating the 
National Judicial Council (KRS) to be unconstitutional and also nullified the law regarding the 
selection process for the President of the Supreme Court (K7/17).  Both of these decisions opened 
the way for new legislation that would later gut the independence of the ordinary judiciary.   On 
top of that, the new president of the Constitutional Tribunal, Ms. Przylebska, publicly blessed ex 
cathedra a number of laws promoted by the PiS government, laws designed to hobble the 
ordinary judiciary, by announcing that there were fully compatible with the separation of powers.   
As this was going on in violation of repeated efforts to get the PiS government to stop, 
the European Commission for the first time engaged the Council, which until then had been 
completely silent on both the Hungarian and Polish cases.  The Council broadly endorsed the 
actions of the Commission in a meeting on 17 May 2017, but did not take action of its own.  
Instead, the Council endorsed the Commission engaging in “dialogue” with the government of 
Poland, dialogue that had, to that point, not been notably successful.   
After the destruction of the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal, the ordinary 
judiciary came next.    In summer 2017, the government brought forward three new laws, all of 
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which were designed to make the courts politically dependent and all of which were passed by 
the PiS-dominated Parliament.   One law would have allowed the KRS, the National Judicial 
Council which makes judicial appointments, to be captured by the PiS party through a new system 
for appointing its members.  Another law would have fired all judges on the Supreme Court, 
subject to discretionary retention upon application to the Justice Minister and Public Prosecutor.   
Finally, the third law permitted the Justice Minister to fire without giving any reasons for their 
dismissal all sitting court presidents throughout the judiciary within six months of the passage of 
the law.  In a move reminiscent of Hungary’s strategy for judicial capture, this third law also 
lowered the judicial retirement age from 67 to 65 for men and 60 for women, thereby opening 
many new senior appointments to the bench that the newly renovated KRS would get to fill.    But 
in the face of massive public demonstrations and critical responses from the European Union, 
President Duda vetoed the first two laws.  He signed the third.     
Immediately thereafter, in July 2017, European Commission issued a third 
Recommendation under the Rule of Law Framework, this time noting both that the 
constitutionality of laws could not be assured given the disabling of the Constitutional Tribunal 
and expressing concern about the laws on the ordinary judiciary.  The two vetoed laws had been 
referred back to the Parliament for further consideration, indicating that the government had 
not given up, but instead intended to move forward with a different version of the same laws.   
Not only was there a systemic threat to the rule of law, the Commission concluded, but the 
situation had seriously deteriorated.   The Polish government still refused to bend. 
Protestors in the streets of Polish cities may have celebrated their victory in getting 
President Duda to veto two of the three offending laws in summer 2017, but the one that allowed 
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the court presidents to be fired with no reason and judges to be subjected to a new retirement 
age took effect and removed key judges from the ordinary courts.     The presidents of the 
ordinary courts assign judges to different divisions of the courts, which could in turn guarantees 
that judges not favored by the government would never get politically sensitive cases.  In 
addition, court presidents can assign and replace particular judges hearing particular cases, which 
means that politically dependent court presidents could ensure that cases came out as the 
government might want.    This law also creates a hierarchy of supervision among court 
presidents, with lower court presidents being reviewable by the presidents of the courts above 
them and so on up the chain until the hierarchy stopped at the Justice Minister who could review 
the performance of all court presidents, providing an ultimate political check on the operation of 
the judiciary.     
Many judges were dismissed soon after this law went into effect.   But because the law 
on the KRS was vetoed so the old KRS was still in place, the government delayed appointments 
to these positions, pending a newly configured KRS to be entrusted with the task of packing them.   
As this occurred, nearly 10% of all of the judgeships in the country were vacant at once, waiting 
for PiS-friendly judges to name their replacements.    
In fall 2017, President Duda emerged with draft laws to replace the two he had vetoed.   
Though these new draft laws were slightly less brutal than the prior laws, the effect was similar.   
Under the new law on the National Judicial Council that makes appointments to the 
judiciary, the KRS was to be filled by judges approved by the governing party and its 
parliamentary majority – as before.  The old members of the KRS, whose four-year terms of office 
were guaranteed in the Constitution, would be immediately dismissed without completing their 
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terms.   This law might well have been deemed unconstitutional because it fired judges with 
constitutionally guaranteed terms of office, but with a captured Constitutional Tribunal, who 
could have said so? 
The new law on the Supreme Court did not fire all of the judges, as the summer law would 
have done, but instead subjected all of the judges to a newly set retirement age of 65.   Given the 
civil-service career paths of most judges in Poland, where judges advance into the more 
important positions only with advancing age, this new retirement age meant that nearly 40% of 
the Supreme Court judges would be dismissed.   Of course, this was the same trick used by the 
Hungarians, and that the European Court of Justice had said was contrary to EU law on age 
discrimination, but given that the Hungarian government only had to pay compensation to the 
fired judges but otherwise they got to keep their captured judiciary, why not try it? 
As these new laws were going through the legislative pipeline, a number of international 
actors chimed in that these laws spelled the destruction of independence of the Polish judiciary.   
Between October and December 2017, the United Nations Special Rapporteur for the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, the Consultative Council of European Judges, the Office of 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE, the Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe, the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary and the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the new laws.  In November, the European 
Parliament passed another resolution against Poland’s assault of the judiciary and in December, 
the Venice Commission issued another critical report these new laws affecting the judiciary 
(Venice Commission, 2017), which the lower house of the Polish parliament nonetheless passed 
without modification on the very same day that the Venice Commission’s report was published.  
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The Polish government didn’t even appear to adjust its strategy for capturing the courts in the 
face of this new criticism.  It barreled ahead, unchecked.   
The European Commission, which had been threatening, and threatening, and 
threatening, all without result, by this time looked completely ineffective.   Finally, on 17 
December 2017, faced with a fait accompli as the Polish government enacted the laws that all 
outside observers had told them not to pass, the European Commission issued a “reasoned 
proposal” to the Council asking the Council to invoke Article 7(1) TEU against Poland.  Never mind 
that Article 7(1) TEU only finds that there is a risk of a breach of European values, while Poland’s 
independent judiciary would already be long gone by the time the procedure was invoked.  Even 
invoking Article 7(1) TEU, with its four-fifths vote of Member States and two-thirds vote of the 
European Parliament, was a political heavy lift, given that the Council had never seen fit to 
publicly condemn either Hungary or Poland for failing Europe’s basic constitutional 
commitments.    Throughout the winter, through the spring and into the summer, the Council 
merely urged the Commission to keep talking to the government of Poland, while in the 
meantime, the new laws took effect.   The Parliament has passed resolutions, but nothing could 
happen without the Council.  Even if Article 7(1) could be invoked, it would simply issue a warning 
without sanctions of any sort.    Poland clearly knew that it could get away with almost anything. 
And so the Polish government tried.   The new law on the Supreme Court didn’t just permit 
the premature removal of nearly one third of the Court’s judges, but it also created a new form 
of judicial review for previously issued final and binding judgments:  the extraordinary appeal.   
This new procedure permits almost any decision made by the Polish courts in the last 20 years to 
be re-opened upon petition by either the Prosecutor General (a.k.a. the Justice Minister) or by 
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the Ombudsperson.  A special new chamber of the Supreme Court, in which new judges 
appointed under the new PiS-dominated system will sit, may then decide the old case in a new 
way.  Suddenly the legal settlement of issues in the decades since the end of communism will be 
up for grabs again.    No legal judgment can be considered to be final any longer.   And all of these 
new decisions about old legal questions will be made by judges who will have been appointed by 
agents put in place by the heavy hand of the PiS party.    
New disciplinary procedures have come to the Polish courts as well.   The new laws 
establish the position of special disciplinary officer directly appointed from among the judges in 
each court by the President of the Republic (himself a key PiS figure) to bring charges against 
judges thought guilty of disciplinary infractions.  The Minister of Justice can inform the President 
about the need to appoint a disciplinary officer, so the process is even more overtly political than 
it might at first seem.    Disciplinary proceedings against judges can use evidence that would be 
otherwise inadmissible in court in normal cases, and judges can be tried in absentia.   There are 
no deadlines for these procedures, which means that judges charged with disciplinary offenses 
could be held in limbo for long periods without a resolution of the charges against them.    Not 
surprisingly, all appeals from these disciplinary proceedings in the ordinary courts must go to 
another new chamber at the Supreme Court set up precisely to handle disciplinary cases against 
judges.  It, too, will be filled with the new judges appointed with the special influence of the 
governing party.    
To make these reforms even more political and less legal, these two new Supreme Court 
chambers – the one to handle cases from the past that have been newly reopened and the one 
to handle disciplinary actions against judges – will have lay judges as part of the mix.  The lay 
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judges – who do not have to have any formal legal training – will be appointed by the upper 
chamber of the parliament (currently dominated by PiS).  While many legal systems have lay 
judges participating in fact-finding and judgment at the trial level, it is highly unusual to introduce 
decision-makers without any legal training at the final stage of appeal only.  The fact that these 
two chambers handle the politically most sensitive issues increases suspicion that the governing 
party is trying to isolate those cases so that they can be handled outside the law as such.   
Even with the Commission’s “reasoned proposal to the Council” pending to trigger Article 
7(1) TEU, the Polish government was undeterred.  On 3 July 2018, the 27 judges whose age 
suddenly precluded them from serving on the Supreme Court saw their terms ended by the new 
law.   The most prominent of those judges, President of the Supreme Court Malgorzata Gersdorf, 
refused to leave office, because she thought that this law was unconstitutional.   (Again, who was 
to say?)  Nearly a dozen of the other judges supported her view and also refused to resign or 
petition the Justice Minister for an exception to the general rule so that they could stay on.  The 
rest either quietly retired or asked the Justice Minister for permission to keep their jobs.    The 
battle for the soul of the Supreme Court of Poland continues as we write.   
The combined effect of all of these changes – achieved with breathtaking speed in just 
three years with the European Commission in hot pursuit – is that the government has captured 
the Constitutional Tribunal so that it now is a mouthpiece of the government.  The PiS 
government has also has put the judges in the ordinary courts under the control of politically 
appointed court presidents with a draconian and arbitrary disciplinary procedure run by PiS-
vetted judges.  Judicial independence from the governing party is not to be tolerated.   All of this 
is occurring in a context in which any decision from the past 20 years can be reopened on a 
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political petition and re-decided however the new government wants.   Judicial independence in 
Poland is well and truly dead.  The irony of this situation was not lost on the Venice Commission: 
 
While the Memorandum [from the Polish government to the Venice Commission 
explaining the rationale for the changes] speaks of the ‘de-communization’ of the Polish 
judicial system, some elements of the reform have a striking resemblance with the 
institutions which existed in the Soviet Union and its satellites [Venice Commission, 2017: 
para 89].   
 
The European Commission, in recommending to the Council that Article 7(1) TEU be 
invoked, had a similarly dire assessment of the state of judicial independence in Poland: 
 
The Commission considers that as a result of laws adopted in 2016 and the developments 
following the appointment of the acting President [of the Constitutional Tribunal], the 
independence and legitimacy of the Constitutional Tribunal is seriously undermined and 
the constitutionality of Polish laws can no longer be guaranteed [European Commission, 
2017: para 109].    
 
At we write, Article 7(1) TEU still hangs in the air in the EU institutions.  The Commission 
has urged the Council to trigger this warning and the European Parliament has indicated its 
readiness to support Council action.  But the other Member States who sit on the Council have 
dragged their feet, lest they be seen to criticize the government of a fellow Member State.  Article 
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7(1) comes with no sanctions; it is merely a warning.   But the time when warnings might have 
made a difference is already over.   
 
III. Why is the EU So Powerless? 
 
Both Hungary and Poland now no longer have reliably independent judiciaries.     And the 
pattern of government attack first on the constitutional courts and then on the ordinary judiciary 
was relentless in both cases.  The Polish courts stood up for themselves and each other (both at 
the Constitutional Tribunal and at the Supreme Court) while the Hungarian courts resisted very 
little, but resistance mattered little in the final outcome.  Autocratic governments have learned 
that if they strike fast and eliminate resistance quickly, they will win facts on the ground – new 
judges already in place willing to do the government’s bidding.  When that happens, the 
autocratic governments have won.   
All of these attacks on judges in both countries occurred in plain sight, were reported in 
real time and were carried out on the basis of laws that were translated quickly for a broader 
audience.  European institutions knew what was happening every step of the way; the Venice 
Commission performed excellent assessments of each major legal change quickly and 
professionally.  No one paying attention could say that they did not know.  The institutions of the 
European Union that could have sanctioned these countries simply took no effective steps to 
make the destruction stop.    
Even now, after the judiciaries have been captured – with political officials ousting the 
regular judges and replacing them with politically compliant ones, with new rules and procedures 
32 
 
that guarantee the dominance of politics over law, and with new institutions designed to cement 
this partisan control for a long time – the European Union has yet to do a single thing that would 
save the independent judiciaries of its Member States.   Why is the EU so powerless? 
One reason – frequently offered by officials in the Barroso Commission – was that the 
European Commission simply did not have the tools to intervene.  To its credit, the Barroso 
Commission, after its experience with Hungary, created the Rule of Law Framework to give itself 
the leverage to act the next time a Member State started attacking basic European values.  But 
as we can see with Poland, the Rule of Law Framework has so far made no difference even when 
it has been used promptly and aggressively.  The Rule of Law Framework is simply not attached 
to sanctions or real consequences, and so Poland has felt free to ignore it.    
Another reason – in our view, more persuasive – is that Member States simply do not 
want to judge each other lest they be judged themselves.   While the Commission and the 
Parliament have both been relatively active in criticizing the decline of both Hungary and Poland, 
the Council – where Member States are represented as Member States – has remained 
completely silent.   It has neither criticized along the way nor voted to censure when called upon 
by other institutions to do so.   When the Hungarian government was capturing the judiciary, 
some have claimed it was protected by the European People’s Party, the party to which Fidesz 
belongs at European level (Kelemen, 2017).  But PiS is a member of the European Reformers and 
Conservatives Group, a marginal party at EU level that has the British Tories as its main anchor.   
Not a lot of political capital there.   And still the Council has so far done nothing.    Member States 
will simply not act against other Member States on matters that look like purely internal affairs.   
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But perhaps an even more obvious reason is attributable to the way that the EU has been 
designed as a legal matter.   Member States delegate competencies to the EU institutions; the 
EU institutions may only act within the competencies that they have been delegated.  And the 
national constitutional structure of Member States is not one of those competencies that has 
been delegated to EU level.   Rather the opposite:  national constitutional structures are 
protected from EU interference by the Treaty on European Union itself: 
 
Article 4(2) TEU:  The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. . . 
 
Unlike federal systems in which a federal constitution is typically supreme and contains 
principles that must be honored down through the regional governments, the EU is definitely not 
a federation.   Instead it operates like two parallel polities.  A sharp partition divides two parallel 
legal systems that are effective on the same territory but that have completely separate 
normative origins.  EU law is supreme with regard to the subjects it has been delegated; national 
law is supreme on the subjects it retains.     Constitutional rule-of-law Member States of the EU 
will have values that harmonize with those at EU level making the partition between the two 
systems nearly invisible, but the Member States that have turned illiberal and no longer respect 
the division of power at national level harden the partition so that the EU cannot reach national 
competencies from its side of the divide.    
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Of course, any two legal systems operating on the same territory have inevitable overlaps 
that will eventually give each system some leverage over the other.  Parallel systems on the same 
territory are inherently unstable.  The EU can be rightly concerned that illiberal governments in 
Hungary and Poland will eventually have an effect on the quality of life and law in the EU just as 
these illiberal governments realize that the EU may eventually figure out how to fight back when 
its values are violated.    
As it turns out, the European Court of Justice has developed a way to cut through the 
partition.  The ECJ has recently held that national judiciaries are dual-use institutions.    While 
national judiciaries have a place in national constitutional systems whose independence from EU 
law is guaranteed in the treaties, national judiciaries also have a central role in the operation of 
the EU.   When those with legal claims believe that their EU law rights have been violated, they 
must go to the national courts, not to the EU courts, for an effective remedy.  The EU courts 
handle a relatively small slice of EU-law cases; the vast majority go through the national courts 
for resolution.   National judiciaries are, therefore, also EU judiciaries. 
In its decision in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas (C-64/16, 
27 February 2018), the European Court of Justice threw out a lifeline to the other European 
institutions seeking to fight the destruction of judicial independence in Hungary and Poland.   The 
case turned on a wholly different issue:  the reduction in salaries of the Portuguese judiciary 
caused by austerity measures imposed during the Euro-crisis.  Dispensing easily with the claim 
that a small across-the-board cut to all public employees threatened the judiciary in particular (it 
didn’t), the ECJ then went on to explain that all Member States were obligated by Article 19(1) 
TEU (“Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the 
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fields covered by Union law”) to have an independent judiciary.  As the Court helpfully 
elaborated: 
 
44.  The concept of independence presupposes, in particular, that the body concerned 
exercises its judicial functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any 
hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or 
instructions from any source whatsoever, and that it is thus protected against external 
interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and 
to influence their decisions . . . .  
 
In short, national judiciaries have a role in both EU law and national law – and EU law requires 
them to be independent.   Independence means no political control -- even from, or perhaps 
especially from, national leaders.   
On the day before the Polish government prematurely terminated the mandate of the 
President of the Supreme Court of Poland and 26 other Supreme Court judges, the European 
Commission began an infringement action against Poland, alleging that Poland had violated its 
Article 19(1) TEU law obligations to maintain an independent judiciary.   If the case is not settled 
with an effective climb-down on Poland’s part, the Commission can turn to the ECJ, which can in 
turn use the Portuguese judges case to find against Poland.  And if Poland fails to comply with 
the decision, the Commission can ask the Court to levy large fines for every day that Poland 
remains in non-compliance.   That’s how infringement actions work, the humble tool of the 
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European Commission to enforce day to day legal violation on the party of Member States.    They 
have real consequences, unlike the warnings of Article 7(1) TEU.     
With the ECJ elevating the infringement action so that it can be used to enforce 
constitutional-level values of the EU, the European Commission has been given a way to save the 
independent judiciaries in Hungary and Poland that does not rely on the courage of the Member 
States to challenge each other.  Of course, the European Commission would have to be equally 
committed to pursuing Hungary as well through a similar infringement action.  But perhaps if the 
Commission can win a strong judgment in the Polish case, it will be emboldened to try.   
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